

Contesting TINA: Community Planning Alternatives for Disaster Reconstruction in Chile

Journal of Planning Education and Research
1–19

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DOI: 10.1177/0739456X16683514

jpe.sagepub.com



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Abstract

Talca, Chile, has been negatively impacted by both a major 2010 earthquake and the ensuing reconstruction process. Talca's poor have been forced out from their neighborhoods and relocated to remote areas where employment, public transportation, and basic services are limited. Based on extensive community development work in Talca, this article analyzes the dynamics that have led to these conditions and the insufficiently supported alternative community-based initiatives that could have allowed Talca to redevelop in more sustainable and equitable ways. Planners need to systemically understand the implications of programs often pushed in times of emergency as urgent and inevitable that may not favor a healthy long-term redevelopment of communities recovering from disasters, be politically savvy and courageous to denounce and resist them when necessary, and work with/for communities to define and promote more just and sustainable postdisaster futures.

Keywords

community planning, disaster (un)fix, earthquake, neoliberal reconstruction, Talca, Chile

The earthquake on February 27, 2010 (27F), in Chile had a magnitude of 8.8 on the Richter scale. The seismic event and its subsequent tsunami caused the deaths of more than 500 people and devastated much of the region of Maule in central Chile. Cities in this area became the epicenter of the damage. Talca, a city in this region, was negatively affected both by the earthquake and the ensuing reconstruction process. The earthquake left more than half of Talca's downtown homes destroyed or badly damaged. Reconstruction policies, meanwhile, facilitated the expansion of real estate dynamics in the city, selectively producing sprawling, gentrifying, and rapidly deteriorating neighborhoods. Many urban poor residents were either forced or bought out of their central neighborhoods and relocated to remote areas where employment, public transportation, and basic services are limited.

Contesting neoliberalism's mantra "There Is No Alternative" (TINA),¹ however, the community resisted these changes through collective action, both in visible ways—holding public demonstrations, producing an alternative master plan, and demanding the reconstruction of public buildings—and in less conspicuous ways—devising new creative ways of using state building subsidies or discarding them to rely instead on the self-management culture that originated their neighborhoods. This article analyzes the dynamics that led to concerning development trends in Talca and the alternative community development initiatives that resisted them, exhibited different results, and would have allowed Talca to redevelop in more sustainable and equitable ways, had they been more extensively supported by the state.

Specifically, we analyze three examples of community-driven interventions in housing and reconstruction planning effectively dismantling the concept of neoliberalism's inevitable response to disasters: the cases of the community-based Reconstruction Plan for Talca, the inclusionary housing project Los Maitenes, and the reconstruction of public buildings that had been targeted for removal and private concessions. These examples show it was possible to develop design and planning models where the needs of the inhabitants of Talca were better served, the costs and benefits of investments more fairly distributed, and the public-private-people partnerships more equitable (Irazábal 2016). We examine how the disaster enabled a variety of actors to advance their aims—including private developers, the state, and albeit not as comprehensively as it could have been, some citizen groups.

The experiences in Talca revealed that only with active citizen organization after the disaster did positive community outcomes result. Such effective citizen organization incorporated cross-sectoral coalition building (including

Initial submission, August 2013; revised submissions, January 2015, April 2016, July 2016, October 2016; final acceptance, June 2016

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professional, academic, governmental, and real estate actors), training in technical and political skills for engagement, place-based proposal-making, multiscalar solidarity, and media savvy. They also demonstrated that the collaboration of the state and the flexibility of planning implementation are necessary, yet insufficient, elements to mediate market forces and produce more sustainable and equitable projects within neoliberal frameworks.

This study builds on more than 6 years of ongoing academic and advocacy involvement in Talca's reconstruction after the earthquake.² It relies on site surveys in and around Talca, leadership and participant observation in reconstruction planning, focus groups, and interviews conducted with representatives of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MINVU), Maule's Regional Housing Authority (SERVIU), the local NGO Surmaule, other NGOs and community groups, and multidisciplinary academics (historians, sociologists, urban studies scholars, planners, and architects) from Universidad Católica del Maule in Talca and Universidad Católica in Santiago. We performed in-depth site and community surveys in Talca's central neighborhoods, as well as geospatial mapping and content analysis of academic, governmental, professional, media, and NGO literature related to the reconstruction process in Talca and Chile.

The "Spatial Fix" Revisited: Disaster (Un)Fix

Harvey (1981, 1982, 2005) explained that capitalism effectively delays, diverts, or overcomes its crises by restructuring its place-based foundations. Schoenberger (2004, 428) summarized this "spatial fix" notion as "a way to productively soak up capital by transforming the geography of capitalism." In effect, one of the main ways in which capitalism is able to "fix" crises of capital overaccumulation and enable ongoing accrual is through spatial reconfigurations—new or renewed market geographies and their materiality. Christophers (2014, 755) asserts, "modern capitalism is constantly in the process of enacting territorial fixes: constituting, segmenting, differentiating and extracting value from actively territorialized markets at a range of geographical scales" (Brenner 1998; Tovar and Irazábal 2014).

Klein offered the complementary notion of "disaster capitalism" (Klein 2007, 6), "the orchestrated raids on the public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events, combined with the treatment of disasters as exciting market opportunities." According to Carey (2010, 12), the notion of disaster capitalism synthesizes three factors: "the exploitation of disasters to implement policies that empower private, capitalist interests; the promotion of neoliberal agendas in these disaster responses; and the rising influence of private entities in supposedly public responses." Geographies of disaster recovery are particularly implicated "in 'fixing'—or fulfilling—capitalist accumulation strategies inasmuch as they are fundamental to processes of

securing market power, configuring economic scarcity and ultimately realizing value" (Christophers 2014, 755–56). In the context of Latin America, disaster capitalism has been analyzed with relation to the transformation of economies in the 1970s, particularly focusing on the military regime in Chile led by Pinochet (Klein 2007), the Andean melting glaciers (Carey 2010), the rebuilding process after the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City (Gamboa de Buen 1990; Davis 1994), hurricanes in Central America (Stonich 2008), and current economic transformations (Irazábal 2009; Robinson 2008).

Building on the concepts of spatial fix and disaster capitalism, we use "disaster (un)fix" to suggest how both in the case of Chile in general, and Talca in particular, the damage caused by the 2010 earthquake has not been fully fixed; instead, it has been purposefully left unfixed. Thus, it has simultaneously been used to "get a fix" by obtaining a desired level of expanded opportunities for capitalist accumulation through energizing previously slow-paced urban regeneration markets and opening new ones of suburban sprawl. Using the case of Talca, we want to not only point out the unfixing of the earthquake damage but also call attention to the opposite—the "fixation" on the re-creation of *urban* disaster (social injustice and environmental damage) to maintain the "fix" (capitalism's high). Hence, the preexisting neoliberal developmental regime in pre-earthquake Talca is now feeding off a "disaster (un)fix." The term plays out the paradox of reconstruction dynamics that feed off the policy-driven unfixing of the disaster. In Talca, then, neoliberalism tries to placate its addiction to the reproduction of capital taking advantage of the disaster without solving it, or rather, while compounding it. In this case, the disaster is used as an excuse and catalyst for the acceleration and intensification of neoliberalism, yet the disaster is not solved through neoliberal interventions; rather, its negative sociospatial effects are morphed and complicated, as we explain below.

Examples that confirm the acceleration and intensification of neoliberalism after the earthquake in Talca include commissioning the Sustainable Reconstruction Plan for Talca (PRES) to a private company with vested real estate interests in Talca without any requirements or oversight; the vast territorial expansion of city limits to favor greenfield, monofunctional housing developments; the urban marketing projects proposed in the adopted plan, which were unrelated to reconstruction needs; and the attempted private concessioning of previously public facilities. These developmental choices precipitated the concentration of capital in fewer hands, the privatization of services, and the financialization of development; changed the architectural, multiuse, and diverse character of the central area of the city; promoted monofunctional suburban sprawl and car dependence; and rolled back the regulatory and mediating role of the state. The deployment of a neoliberal reconstruction model was so hegemonic that it seemed as if "there was no alternative"; however, as we later discuss, there were viable alternatives to the neoliberal approach.

Talca Post-Earthquake: Expanded Neoliberal Laboratory

The National Context

With the advice of Milton Friedman and *laissez faire* colleagues from the University of Chicago, military dictator Pinochet imposed an economic regime of free markets in Chile in the 1970s and 1980s. It led to favorable macroeconomic and growth performance, yet at a high social cost of privatization of education, health, and social security. This neoliberal regime, declared “the Chilean miracle” in 1982 by Friedman, also led to the growing concentration of economic power among small elite groups in Chile and limits to the democratic system that persisted after the departure of the Pinochet regime. Today as a member country of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Chile continues to build a market economy in a highly inegalitarian society, which presents significant difficulties in challenging a state policy and ideology that has become very entrenched. The 27F earthquake opened an unparalleled opportunity to contest the basic premises of the regime, but with the start of a conservative party administration less than 2 weeks after 27F and the spatial “fixing” opportunities that the disaster laid open, neoliberal development was instead intensified. The earthquake reconstruction was steered by the new centrist-right government led by president Sebastián Piñera, which replaced a centrist-left alliance that had ruled Chile for five consecutive terms.

The country lacked strategic planning tools to address the physical, social, and economic consequences of the disaster. Public planning in the country regressed since the 1970s by the unfettered application of a free-market model.³ Yet, a National Plan for Reconstruction (NPR; MINVU 2010) and a set of master plans, particularly the Sustainable Reconstruction Plans (PRES), emerged as the main planning instruments in the context of the 2010 reconstruction process nationwide (Imilán et al. 2014). The NPR was produced very early (in May 2010) and contained well-intentioned ideas by planners associated with the new government; however, the plan was decoupled from the reconstruction process that followed, as the evaluations according to post-earthquake reports show (see Table 1). The NPR proposed a framework that allowed private channel aid and civil organizations to promote reconstruction through public–private partnerships led by municipalities. However, there was not an explicit approach by the government for citizen participation and for the role the private sector would play. The allocation of human, technical, and financial resources was governed by the actors’ interest in joining processes in particular locations rather than based on needs. This inevitably resulted in inequities in the allocation of available resources.

The NPR used previously existing urban and housing policy, programs, and instruments (Letelier and Boyco

2011). According to government statements, the decision not to create special institutions responded to two factors: first, the perceived solvency and strength of existing housing institutions and public policies; and second, the rush to generate solutions in the shortest time (Comerio 2013, 2014). This is partially consistent with Schwab’s (2014) findings about the overarching goals that inform recovery plans: use resources effectively, increase the speed of recovery, and increase opportunities for community betterment. There was also an ideological undercurrent to the decision—the state does not execute plans as well as the private sector—backed by a sense that the government and the system of social housing in Chile ran like a well-oiled machine. This assessment, however, did not consider issues such as the right to location by disaster victims. Indeed, shelter replacements could be done with existing rules; what could not be done, however, was to plan more systemically to ensure families maintained their original or similarly beneficial residential locations. Consequently, the plan failed to identify a strategy for neighborhood rehabilitation and instead focused efforts on creating housing.

The NPR only offered policy guidance without associated regulatory instruments. Thus, the basis of public action in the reconstruction was oriented mainly to finance home purchases via demand subsidy instruments (in practice it acted as a supply subsidy), that is, provide families a voucher allowing them to purchase a home within specific market guidelines for a given time frame. MINVU established the amounts of the subsidies, which in some cases were grossly insufficient to tackle housing needs, and adjustments according to regions and building costs were not allowed. All this had three main implications:

- Absence of comprehensive vision: planning did not assume the systemic complexity of the damage or its multidimensionality.
- Invisibility of victims’ and communities’ use-value assets: location, for example, was not considered a right, or even an asset factor, but a commodity.⁴
- Minimization of the planning role of the public sector: it mainly concentrated in providing subsidies for housing construction or repair.

Strongly backed by the presidency, the PRES plans were presented as a new model of public–private cooperation to conduct planning. PRES plans arose with the mandate not only to meet the needs produced by the catastrophe but also to increase the strengths and competitive advantages of the affected urban centers (Cuadros and Serra 2014). The plans, however, occurred within the context of a weakened state apparatus across all levels and sectors, low social and political legitimacy, and a deterioration of urban planning systems on the decline since the 1970s.

Table 1. Reconstruction Assessment in Accordance with the Objectives of the National Reconstruction Plan.

Objectives Set by the National Reconstruction Plan	Evaluation According to Post-earthquake Reports
Reconstruct the social and urban fabric devastated by the earthquake	The reconstruction model intensified the processes of socio-spatial segregation by promoting the dislocation of the poor from areas of higher property values and their relocation in more peripheral areas.
Appreciate the relationship of communities to land and protect their sense of belonging	The community and neighborhood levels were absent from the reconstruction model. There were no specific programs and plans for the rural areas. The reconstruction model propitiated rural to urban migration. Urban communities were also fractured.
Protect the identity and architectural heritage of communities	There was no state institutional framework leading the recovery and protection of heritage. Only some partial changes to existing instruments were done. Gentrification is observed, which has damaged the architectural and urban heritage of cities, mainly in older neighborhoods that after deterioration and neglect have been renovated through actions that destroy their identifying character of place, threatening their patrimonial condition and their social fabric.
Decentralize and strengthen local and regional institutions	By not defining an ad hoc institutionality (centralized and/or decentralized), the reconstruction model overwhelmed the precarious regional and local institutions. Deconcentration occurred more than decentralization, since it did not involve the transference of more resources, more power, or new technical capabilities. The logic of decentralization of government was based on the transfer of functions to sectoral structures (ministries) and territorial institutions dependent on the central government. Smaller municipalities, usually rural, were the least qualified to assume an important role in the process given their asymmetric situation vis-à-vis the market for the reconstruction and private developers. Among the weaknesses detected that contribute to slow the process are low technical capacity and institutional support, lack of coordination between different levels of process control, lack of technical information, bypassing of the municipalities' technical staff, and excessive centralization.
Empower communities as coproducers and stewards of their own reconstruction plans	Absence of the neighborhood scale in the reconstruction model. The process has focused on individual solutions for individual problems. The state has not granted to the community or their organizations an important role in the reconstruction. Citizen participation is understood by the Reconstruction Plan as the opportunity to select a housing typology. Despite this, citizens have articulated to defend their rights in a process that has shown little interest in the collective. In terms of urban reconstruction plans, participatory processes have been very different and have basically remained at the discretion of the executor or financier (in some cases a large, private economic group). In all cases, these processes had a short duration, which also hindered the participation of the community. Finally, as the Master Plans are nonbinding, in cases where there has been participation, there is no guarantee that it will affect the planning decisions that were finally taken.
Promote the reconstruction of housing in the same place where they were destroyed.	About sixty thousand housing subsidies (more than 50 percent of the total) resulted in the relocation of families.
Avoid eradication of rural areas	The rural sector has suffered the reconstruction model's dependence on the private enterprise, mainly expressed through the action of EGIS and development firms. This reconstruction has been slower given that distance and dispersion of the victims make it unprofitable for companies to undertake reconstruction projects, especially if the demands refer to housing repairs or reconstructions on owners' sites. The self-building subsidy, designed to facilitate solutions in rural areas where the market showed no interest, had to September 2013 only 381 completed works.
Promote competition to foster quality in the supply of solutions	The housing reconstruction process has been carried out with the same pre-earthquake housing policy. This policy tends to mass-produce standardized solutions and to concentrate in large construction companies that control much of the regional and national markets. This reality has remained post-earthquake. Most new housing supply is concentrated in the outskirts of cities, without much innovation in design and variability in footage. These homogenous new housing tracts generally exceed three hundred units.

In the Maule region, 26 different reconstruction plans were developed. According to Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública (2014), the intent of PRES plans involved guiding decisions related to the allocation of grants for housing reconstruction and repairs; prioritizing infrastructure reconstruction projects; establishing criteria for long-term and urban planning investment; encouraging economic, social, and environmental development; and incorporating opportunities for citizen participation.⁵ Yet, these new plans had neither defined government oversight nor specific funding. Non-binding, the plans were meant to become a convergent space of public–private interests to design physical planning interventions often disassociated from actual reconstruction needs (Imilán et al. 2014). The state gave urban planning powers to private institutions for the first time without requirements about the scope of these plans or the allocation of responsibilities (Moris and Walker 2014; see map 2).

Lastly, the government pursued a national and international media strategy focused on communicating an image of a reconstruction process showing strong political leadership and broad citizen participation (MINVU 2013; Moris and Walker 2014). Publicly available statistics were deceiving, corresponding to the provision of subsidies and not to the actual construction and delivery of houses (Presidencia de Chile 2014). International disaster experts were invited to assess the reconstruction process, but were only given access to government representatives and sources.⁶

Talca: The Pre-Earthquake City

Alesch, Arendt, and Holly (2009) state that the trends in place prior to an event are strong indicators of post-event outcomes. Talca was a suburbanizing city prior to the earthquake and there was a lack of investment in regeneration of the central city zones. The earthquake brought these tendencies to the forefront and magnified them. Similarly, after disasters, research in all countries shows that there is no “return to normalcy.” Some people never return to their old neighborhoods after a disaster and people from other areas repopulate them (Inam 2005; Schwab 2014). Accordingly, in Talca the central neighborhoods changed and will continue to change. Yet, we argue that much more could have been and still can be done to support community betterment, including opportunities for people to remain or return to central areas in Talca.

Before the earthquake, Talca was being increasingly affected by neoliberal urban strategies, which in turn had been decreasing its social cohesion (Letelier 2010). However, the process had a slightly slower pace compared to other Chilean urban centers (Poduje 2011). In fact, until 2010, Talca was one of the intermediate cities with the lowest levels of segregation in the country. One of the features that had resisted neoliberal urban transformations was a large, dynamic, and heterogeneous historic center—representing approximately 20 percent of the total urban

area. This sector consists of fifteen neighborhoods shaped since the mid-nineteenth century by the residents’ self-management and a state with greater willingness to regulate urban development. In 2002, there were approximately 11,538 dwellings and 38,078 people living in these neighborhoods, of which approximately 13,327 did so as tenants or *allegados*—extended family or friends (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2002).

The historic center of Talca, unlike other cities in Chile, was characterized by the heterogeneity of its social fabric. It was the area with some of the highest quality of public spaces (Letelier and Boyco 2011). It also had some of the highest concentrations of land value (over 5UF⁷ per square meter, MINVU and Geociudad Consultores 2007). Socioeconomic diversity, urban quality, and relatively high land values coexisted in this area and ran counter to the development trends of the last forty years (Valdivieso 2013). Central location afforded residents the ability to participate in the benefits that the city offered (Jouffe 2011), at least until the earthquake.

The Earthquake’s Damage in Maule and Talca

The 2010 earthquake affected an area of 232 square kilometers in Maule and a population of 238,817 people, 4 percent of whom were in the rural sector (International Labour Organisation and Labour Studies Institute Foundation 2010). Official data indicated 7,954 victims with a total of 28 fatalities (El Centro, February 28, 2011). The geo-referenced municipal land registry used by the PRES indicated Talca’s concentration of damage focused on the old historic center based on the foundational grid. In Figure 1, the “polygon of damage” is divided into fifteen sectors corresponding with the historical configuration of the city neighborhoods.⁸ In the center of the polygon is the commercial downtown. The land registry tracked the level of damage in each neighborhood, ranging between 41 and 90 percent. Subsequent work taking samples from blocks in the historic center confirmed that the average level of building damage in the area was about 60 percent (Surmaule and CEUT 2013; Figure 2). Considering the damage at the building-only level, however, was inappropriate as the scale of damage was definitely urban.

Disaster (Un)Fix in Talca

The government’s decision to use and adapt pre-existing instruments meant maintaining and strengthening neoliberal urban policies and programs that the country had been implementing for the last forty years. Hence, the reconstruction model further facilitated the private sector’s role in the production of housing “solutions.” The role of the state concentrated on streamlining processes, injecting resources for housing subsidies, and developing incentives for the private sector to participate in the reconstruction process. The municipalities, given their limited attributes and technical capabilities, generally did not play an important role in




Figure 1. Polygon of damage and neighborhoods affected by the earthquake in Talca.



Figure 2. 2010 earthquake damage in Talca. See neighbors living and socializing in the street. Photo: Alexis Martinez.

demanding articulation between communities and the reconstruction. This was clearly the case in Talca, where a public-private board headed by a regional newspaper made reconstruction decisions (Letelier and Boyco 2011). The real estate sector, operating under the pre-earthquake logic, sought to maximize profit and concentrated the production of social housing in two large companies: Independence and SOCOVESA, which rapidly developed a new housing supply in sectors where they had vast parcels of land in the outskirts of the city.

For the most part, the reconstruction subsidies did not address the needs of many residents and were operated at the private sector's will. The subsidies for the affected families to rebuild their homes on their own land were insufficient. According to a sampling done by the Center of Urban and Territorial Studies (CEUT) and Surmaule (2013), more than 40 percent of the lots damaged by the earthquake had not had any type of intervention in three years after the earthquake. The opportunities for non-owners who resided in the central districts to remain in their location were also limited. Families who could not prove ownership of their land, or failed to get the approval of all members of the hereditary succession to apply for a housing solution on their own site, only had the option to apply for a subsidy to purchase a new or used home elsewhere (of up to UF500, approx. US\$20,000). The majority of these housing units were constructed at the edges of the city. The same happened to families living in rented or collective housing whose homes were classified as "unrecoverable." Families living in "recoverable" homes they didn't own were classified as unable to receive any subsidy. Thus, only a few families met the qualifications for building a new home on their own land and maintain their location. According to data from MINVU in 2012, a total of 1,237 subsidies were allocated to build on the site itself, although there were approximately three thousand houses that were declared irreparably damaged (Surmaule and CEUT 2013). This means that less than 50 percent of household owners by law or in succession that previously lived downtown were able to maintain their original location.

A less visible problem likely to deteriorate in the long run is the situation of the families whose homes were left in a "repairable" condition. In addition to the aforementioned problems to prove land ownership, the subsidy to repair their homes was only UF50 (US\$2,000) when repair costs typically surpassed US\$10,000. The difficulty to get a repair allowance and its monetary limit meant that no more than 30 percent of households used state support for repairs (Surmaule and CEUT 2013). Many families who repaired their homes with either subsidies or their own resources failed to recover 100 percent of the house habitability, and in many cases the houses are likely to undergo a rapid deterioration of its use value.

In synthesis, about three thousand families lost their location and just as many might do so in the coming years. Contrary to the benefits they had in the center of the city, the

move to the urban fringe involved being away from sources of employment, commerce, and opportunities; limited access to a poor standard of infrastructure and services; and in some cases social stigmatization because of their location (Sabatini, Cáceres, and Cerda 2001). Reconstruction policies have thus not made special provisions to effectively respond to the conditions created by the disaster, operating instead through the same institutional apparatus deployed under ordinary situations, without public mediation except to issue vouchers to those few entitled to receive them. The instability that many of the residents of the affected neighborhoods had regarding house/land ownership was not addressed by the state, neither were considerations such as maintaining roots or having access to opportunities available to those living in the city center (Galster and Killen 1995).

Meanwhile, the displacement of families from the center to the periphery "liberated" a lot of new urban land centrally located at a high market value. The percentage of land for sale or sold rose from 5 to 10 percent between 2012 and 2013 (Surmaule and CEUT 2013), and as empty lots are taxed, this percentage may increase. This new stock has gradually passed into the hands of large developers. On the other hand, nearly four thousand subsidies were allocated to purchase new or used housing in large complexes located in the outskirts of the city (see Figure 3), exacerbating the scale of segregation that had been growing in Talca since before the earthquake and increasing connectivity problems, commuting times, and family costs.

The implemented reconstruction model facilitated the real estate market's access to areas of the city that were previously out of its reach. This led to reconstruction progress in places where the housing market generated higher rates of return, and conversely, minimal progress where the profit potential was less. Some of the decisions or omissions of public policy that contributed to these reconstruction trends were as follows:

- The absence of government mediation between housing supply and earthquake victims.
- Lack of incentives (and mandates) for the real estate market to repair or replace homes in the city center on the lots of the families affected. Without a specific location incentive for this, private investors sought to maximize their investment generating higher-value projects aimed at the middle and upper-middle classes. This led to more than 40 percent of the affected properties remaining as vacant lots, equivalent to at least 700,000 m² potentially available for new building projects (Surmaule and CEUT 2013).
- The incentives via government subsidy for the development of new high-value housing complexes and multifamily buildings in particular neighborhoods, for example, Las Heras and Seminario, where repopulation by higher-income people is evident. These incentives were supposedly intended to generate




Figure 3. Social housing projects evaluated for environmental impact since March 2010 in Talca.

housing for earthquake victims. Yet, victims had difficulty accessing this supply because it required capacity for co-payment or obtaining mortgages—which they often did not have. The units were then released to the market in three months after victims did not demand them.⁹

- The push by the PRES and local government for new public–private projects in areas of high value in the city, particularly converting public property/land into private or public–private through the Shared Urban Financing law: Mercado Estación, railway station, Mercado Central, and Concentrated Schools, among others.
- The incentives for the production of lower-value housing on the outskirts of the city for poor inhabitants of the historic center, via the PRES’s expansion of city limits and the delivery of a large amount of subsidies for the purchase of new or used social housing. These trends were also facilitated by a lack of disincentives for new greenfield development.

The urban results of the post-earthquake neoliberal push include the incorporation of a new and valuable stock of

urban land into the real estate market; the development of a new, cheap social housing stock on the outskirts of the city; and the development of a new stock of high-value homes downtown. Choosing to rebuild with the same tools that were previously used deepened the consequences that these instruments were already producing: urban sprawl, residential segregation, the loss of social networks, and finally the loss of quality of life (Rasse and Letelier 2013). The benefits and costs of these options were not equitably distributed, neither in immediate terms—with the sale and construction of land and housing—nor in the long term with the city form determined by mass-produced housing, dependence on private transportation, and previous public projects/lands given in concession/ownership to the private sector. The expansion of city limits ran counter to the intentional creation of a concentrated city center, and the so-called trigger projects proposed in Talca’s PRES did not address reconstruction needs while promoting privatization. Developers were the primary players to benefit from the focus on single-family, detached dwelling units to address the housing deficit and its production and allocation management through subsidies. Losses accrued to extended families, tenants, and guest residents

who did not qualify for subsidies that allowed them to resettle in their original places of residence.

“There Are Alternatives”: Community Planning Routes

For those living in the city, their neighborhoods had “use value”: people were experientially and emotionally connected to their places. For others, such spaces exclusively had “exchange value.” The dispute in post-earthquake Talca was between these two ways of conceiving the city. In practice, the reconstruction policy favored the exchange value of urban land where once there were neighborhoods that people felt social and physical attachment to (Hidalgo and Hernandez 2001). Yet, many Talqueños defended their relationship with the city’s use value pursuing collective action. TINA was contested.

Tarrow’s (1998) concept of “political opportunities” relates the success of collective action with a certain configuration of opportunities in the environment. Collective action needs real capacity to influence change. Yet, actual spaces for citizen participation and state–civil society dialogue in Talca’s reconstruction were marginal. Although citizens offered proposals for the reconstruction process, very few were considered by the municipal, regional, or central governments. Despite this, there have been gains and advances by the processes of collective action, such as the building of local and national networks and the appropriation and coproduction of technical and political knowledge/skills, attainment and deployment of media savvy, and use of judicial mechanisms. We analyze tensions between the top–down planning model deployed in Talca and community planning in three main cases where collective action disrupted the prevalent reconstruction *modus operandi* and enacted, with different levels of success, alternative community-driven reconstruction logics.

The Community-Based Reconstruction Plan

A few days after the earthquake, a group of people involved with professional associations, universities, public services, and NGOs formed what was later called the Technical Committee for Reconstruction. The consensus was that reconstruction efforts should place civil society in a leading role and avoid the commodification of the disaster. The group identified two specific tasks: to guide emergency action by generating and distributing information directed to individuals and families affected, especially recommending them not to sell their properties and to stay in their neighborhoods; and to organize multidisciplinary teams of volunteers to provide technical guidance and information in the most affected sectors of the city (Letelier 2010).

In March 2010, the Technical Committee received the mayor of Talca, who through the President of the Association of Architects of Maule commissioned a comprehensive proposal for reconstruction, which was presented to the City

Council and unanimously supported on April 14 (El Centro, April 15, 2010; Council minutes, April 14, 2010). The proposed Reconstruction Plan considered a collaborative work between two entities: a Technical Consortium (a public–private partnership led by the municipality), whose work would be directed to develop and implement a plan for the reconstruction of the affected areas of the city agreed upon by all stakeholders and a network of neighborhood development committees (Table 2). The latter would organize the demand for housing and would take care of the design and development requirements, while serving as the implementation workforce. The plan considered three management variables: first, that it was financially viable and a catalyst of economic development; second, that it aimed to improve energy efficiency, seismic standards, and the environmental impact of the buildings; and third, that it contributed to the public good, promoting the active participation of people in the reconstruction process, creating social capital, and allowing for the value capture of new development to be justly distributed (Comité Técnico de Reconstrucción 2010).

However, a few days after the City Council approved the proposal, and despite the participatory and consensual process that had produced the community plan, the national government and the mayor decided to request another reconstruction plan from one of the major economic groups in the country, Grupo Hurtado. The resulting PRES Talca, developed between May and August 2010, hardly addressed any aspect directly linked to the effects of the earthquake, but outlined a strategy for managing the city based on the idea of urban marketing and the modernization of public services via private investment and management. The PRES defined “urban trigger projects” (a new north–south axis road, an intermodal station, and parkland on the banks of the Río Claro) and provided a set of guidelines for how the restoration of public buildings—such as the Mercado Central and two public schools named Concentrated Schools—should be managed. These guidelines focused on “generating a ‘brand’ for Talca, anchored in activities that differentiate it” (MINVU 2010, 93).

Through this PRES intervention, Talca’s mayor found a shorter and less controversial reconstruction road than that of working with the community. This achieved his aim to move quickly from the special period of reconstruction back to regular governance mode. For him, a reconstruction process that granted a protagonist role to community organizations was highly risky. To tackle the issue of “landless” people—many of whom resided in central areas without land titles before the earthquake—for example, would have implied a controversial public debate over the reconstruction process, which he wanted to minimize. Thus, the position of the municipality was of purposeful omission of this and other reconstruction challenges, opting to understand them only as a matter of access to housing, which the “normal” system of the housing market and subsidy allocations was supposed to solve (Letelier 2014).

Table 2. Characterization of Entities Involved in Reconstruction Planning in Talca.

Entities Involved	Interests	Strategies/Actions
Government: Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MINVU) / Regional Service of Housing and Urbanism (SERVIU)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Accelerate the delivery of subsidies and housing Facilitate the role of the private sector in the reconstruction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delivery of subsidies Direct assignment of projects to private developers
Municipality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leave behind the earthquake and resume its municipal agenda Collaborate with central government (of political affinity) Avoid the emergence of complex demands 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Avoid direct responsibility for reconstruction works Focus on extra-reconstruction agenda
Dominant real estate actors (builders / real estate firms / Social RE Management Entity [EGIS])	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen real estate supply in the central area of greater value Develop urban projects on the outskirts of the city 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rapid development of affordable housing projects on the periphery Development of middle and upper middle strata condominiums in the historic center Pressure to generate extra subsidies for projects in the downtown area
Affected families	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Get housing solution, preferably in the same neighborhood 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formation of committees, seeking political support, self-help building Self-financing of the reconstruction and repair works
Civil society organizations (NGOs, movements, advocacy groups)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defend the right to location of centrally-located earthquake victims, whether landowners or landless 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of alternative proposals to the urban reconstruction plan Establishment of landless committees Knowledge generation and public advocacy

By virtue of this disrespectful and frustrating decision and the ensuing loss of confidence in its political representatives, the Reconstruction Committee in Talca initiated a process of dissolution. However, some of the institutions that resigned (the Architects Association and some NGOs) resolved to continue supporting the neighborhoods most devastated by the earthquake and created a partnership with social organizations to become critical of the top-down planning process that was ensuing, which was also widely supported by the mainstream media. This resulted in the local chapter of the Architects Association and NGOs forming the Organizing Assembly of the Council of Talca, in June 2010.

The social mobilization against the imposed plan was not more widespread for several reasons. Many people were still in an emergency or basic recovery phase. Either they or their loved ones lacked basic housing and services and felt pressed to toil hard just to get by or to turn to the individual subsidies to alleviate their urgent housing need, thus abandoning collective action. Others became frustrated after much disappointment with no tangible progress in their collective struggles. Finally, in the context of Chile, it is important not to dismiss the lingering demobilizing effects that a long dictatorial period (1973–1990) has had in civil society.

Despite the fact that the community-driven reconstruction plan could not prevail, there are critical lessons coming out of this planning experience: The substance, players, objectives, and decision-making processes of the community plan contrasted with those of the PRES. The community reconstruction

plan emphasized a consensus-building *process*, while the PRES focused on an urban renewal + sprawl *product*. The former focused on reconstruction, taking into account the needs of the existing community; the latter favored revitalization and suburbanization, paying little attention to reconstruction needs and expanding unchecked private sector participation, promoting a gentrified and segregated city future. The prevalence of the PRES over the community plan demonstrated the determinant role of the state favoring big private interests at the expense of civil society ones in the reconstruction process. Yet, such a model did not go unchallenged, neither in Talca, where community-based initiatives continued to contest it with some degree of success, as two next examples demonstrate, nor in the country at large, where the political party in power lost the following presidential elections in 2013.

The next two cases focus on neighborhood, as opposed to city, recovery—another scale of great interest to planners.

The “Landless” People and Los Maitenes Project

A few weeks after the earthquake and with encouragement from the NGO Surmaule, non-landowning families in different neighborhoods began to organize themselves. They knew the policies implemented hindered their chances of remaining in the neighborhoods: the resources allocated for social housing made the market favor the construction of large projects in the periphery of the city. On the other hand, the majority of families did not qualify for credit that would



Figure 4. Meeting of landless committee. Photo: Surmaule.

Note: Observe the primary participation of women and the apparent lack of heating conditions in the wooden cabin.

allow them to increase their purchasing capacity and many families in collective or rented houses did not meet the conditions to qualify for subsidies. The only possibility for people not to be displaced was to organize and identify political opportunities to make demands on the state.

In mid-2010, four committees of “landless” people formed: the committee “Santa Ana, My Life, My Neighborhood” in the Santa Ana neighborhood, “HABACUT” in the Eastern neighborhood, “San Pelayo” in Seminario, and “Future and Hope” in Paso Moya. The committees brought together over a hundred households (Figure 4). They formed a coalition called “Association of Committees for a Home in My Neighborhood.” Both the association and the separate committees had intense activity between 2010 and 2012. Among the most important actions developed were the following:

- Organizational activities building trust and strengthening the identity of the committees
- Training (and self-training) initiatives associated with the legal, technical, and political frameworks related to their demands
- Management of housing subsidies, land searches, and relations with EGIS (private companies of “social real estate management” in charge of administering MINVU’s subsidies) and builders
- Development of specific proposals to address their problems
- Articulation of dialogues and demands with local, regional, and national authorities

- Participation in wider social alliances, such as the Citizen Movement All with Talca and the National Movement for Just Reconstruction

The association believed that there were sufficient policy instruments and funding to rebuild housing in the central neighborhoods and allow people to stay, but there was no sufficient will in government officials or developers to put the existing bureaucratic apparatus into producing appropriate housing solutions. This is clear in an excerpt from the letter sent November 16, 2010, by the association to the then Minister of Housing and Urban Development after meeting with her Regional Secretary:

In the interview with [the person in charge of SERVIU] we were able to realize that there was no willingness or receptivity for our proposals. We also realized that everything becomes more difficult in the region, as everything is highly centralized in Santiago. Although a few minutes of attention were given to us, we were not satisfied with the response given, since we were told that “the subsidies are set, and you just have to use them. The EGIS should solve the detected problems” (Association of Committees for a Home in My Neighborhood 2010a)

Elsewhere, the association’s letter states:

To achieve our goal, which is to stay in our neighborhoods, we require the will and creativity of all stakeholders, authorities, and neighbors. We propose that existing

Table 3. Problems and Solutions Presented to Government by the Association of Committees for a Home in My Neighborhood.

Problem	Proposed Solution	Regulation
Subsidy instruments fail to address the problem of high land costs	To streamline and merge tools (e.g., subsidies for height, equipment, and disability) a. Grant maximum amounts for each grant b. Request that all of the 200UF are used for land purchase and that other instruments facilitate lot urbanization, e.g., the development firm authorizing initiative or sanitation funds to habilitate lots (the intended lots are already mostly urbanized given their location). Standardize Urban Renewal subsidies or declare Priority Development Zones adapting social housing in neighborhoods that are not covered.	Housing Reconstruction Program, Minute MINVU 10/9/2010 D.S. 174, title XVI, article 64, 65, 65 bis, 68, and 68 bis Urban renewal plan of the city of Talca
Committees currently exceed the accepted 20 percent of families considered unaffected	Enlarge the percentage of families unaffected allowed to integrate committees.	Exempt resolution 2186 – I-F, 4/9/2010
The existence of government land intended for an individual, a business, or uses different from housing	Give priority to victims to build homes in these lands and support the processing of use change in the municipalities if necessary.	Zoning
Neighbors that aren't registered as victims because the registry is closed	Reopen the registry of victims, with verification of social security cards or other means such as registration at health centers or payment receipts.	Registry of victims
Inappropriate definitions of what qualifies a victim or affected family	Recognize as victims the survivors that are living guests (<i>allegados</i>) or nonhomeowners with certificates categorizing their housing units as uninhabitable but repairable, so that they can qualify for subsidies.	Exempt resolution 2185, 4/9/2010-10-28 Exempt resolution 2186, 4/9/2010 D.S. 332 of 2000 and its modifications D.S. 121 DL 2002 Surmaule D.S. 224 of 2006 D.S. 174 title III, article 4
Individual victims aren't qualified to receive subsidies	Recognize survivors registered in social security who happen to be single, caring for children, elderly, or living with relatives, so that they can qualify for subsidies.	
It is unattractive for developers to work on projects with few units	Integrate into the project the immediate construction of expansion plans mandatory in every proposed project, through the subsidies for expansion and surroundings.	7.D.S. 255 paragraph IX, article 16
Delayed delivery of resources and payments	Find a way to expedite the management of permits and payments through all involved authorities.	8.D.S. 174 title XVI, article 69

Source: Association of Committees for a Home in My Neighborhood 2010b.

instruments become more flexible. For example, that the subsidy of up to UF200 intended for the purchase and development of land be granted in full at once and that its use be intended for land purchase. This would facilitate the purchase of land in our own neighborhoods.

Table 3 below presents other examples of the demands and proposed solutions that the association presented at various meetings with government officials. The proposals were consistent with existing instruments and required political will, more than substantial policy changes, to see them through. Despite the community's capacity for dialogue and proposal making and its explicit demand for the right to remain in place presented in all claims made between 2010 and 2012, the authorities did not incorporate the non-land-owning victims' demands and their desire to remain in the neighborhood.

One of the committees, however, managed to build a project that deserves recognition as an example that would have been appropriate to further replicate: the San Pelayo committee in the Seminario neighborhood with "Los Maitenes" project. This housing complex is located in La Florida sector of Talca, and although for the affected families it meant moving away from their original neighborhood, it offered a solution of high construction standards in a still highly accessible location.

The San Pelayo committee consisted of twenty families mostly led by single-female households. They lived in one of the most historic neighborhoods of downtown Talca, characterized by its centrality and its rich social history closely linked to the Catholic Church and the period of industrialization of Talca (1920–1970), with a rich diversity of social organizations. Micaela Torres, a young accountant with no previous experience as a community leader, coordinated the



Figure 5. Typological contrast between the housing projects Los Maitenes (left) and Villa El Parque III (right). The latter represents the typically favored post-earthquake housing project typology. This complex has 400 two-story social housing units of 47 m² each. Photos: José Luis Gajardo (left) and María Elvira Valdivieso (right).

committee. The participation of a local construction company was key. The collaboration between the committee and this company, plus the work of the NGO Surmaule and the design of the architectural NGO Reconstruye, made possible the development of the first post-earthquake multifamily, inclusionary housing project in a central urban area in Chile.

Los Maitenes consists of two 4-story buildings with thirty-eight units of 592 square feet, twenty of which have been allocated to victims of the earthquake (and therefore subject to subsidy), with the remaining eighteen sold using subsidy DS40 (now DS1—a subsidy for the “emergent middle class” of up to UF1000). As the housing complex incorporates inhabitants of different social strata, it replicates the social diversity that existed in the victims’ original neighborhood. This type of solution contributes to the reduction of sociospatial segregation and inequality that the reconstruction model is otherwise accelerating. Micaela Torres, president of the San Pelayo committee, relates:

Nobody thought much about it because we started counting the money and it was not nearly enough. . . . The builders generally make 70% of profits, but these projects cannot afford that much, so then no one was biting. But Reconstruye made this integration project especially for us: our building will have 38 apartments, 20 will be for the committee and the other 18 will be sold to anyone and that will generate profits to interest the builder and to be able to pay the owner of the land, because the location subsidy was not enough. If we wanted to do the 20 units and no more, we would not have made it, so we had to do something different. For that we are the only committee in Talca that has accomplished something concrete. (Micaela Torres, February 26, 2012, <http://Surmaule.levantemosciudadania.cl/archives/2785>)

This case demonstrated that post-earthquake policy instruments, despite not having been specially designed to recover the neighborhoods and damaged homes, could have been used in a more creative and supportive way than they typically were. The impediments to a more extensive practice along this

line were the government’s role as subservient to capital and the way it dismissively treated the participation of communities and their organizational and proposal-making skills. Those tensions were clearly expressed by the San Pelayo committee chair while laying the foundation for Los Maitenes:

The government does not have the commitment or genuine desire to solve problems in a dignified manner, handing the reconstruction over to the real estate market, so we want to make clear that this project was not a government initiative, that the bureaucracy was originally an obstacle. The same thing happened with the municipality and it would be easy to thank them now that we’ve reached our goal, but we don’t think that’s how a country is rebuilt. (El Centro, March 28, 2012, <http://Surmaule.diarioelcentro.cl/?q=noticia&id=1064828>)

In addition to the community’s involvement, Los Maitenes was possible as a result of the significant contributions of NGOs related to social promotion and architectural design, and the local construction company La Provincia, owned by the person who at the time was also the president of the Architects Association of the Maule region. These stakeholders mediated between the demands of the families (adequate housing and location) and the instruments of the state. In the case of Los Maitenes, the state did not take a lead; although, to its merits, it was an essential follower. Rather, the project was generated by the intrinsic motivation of community stakeholders committed to developing a more inclusive city. Successful social mobilization also required support from small investors and a willingness to negotiate from all actors involved. Despite the project’s difficulties and limitations, it went beyond the mold of housing solutions commonly offered (in terms of design and real estate typology, planning process, and application of existing funding and institutional instruments), showing that it was possible to develop models where the housing needs of the people of Talca were better served, costs and benefits were more fairly distributed, and public–private–people partnerships were more equitable (Figure 5).

This experience could be replicated in Talca, particularly now that a successful building precedent exists and the new national government is supposedly more inclined to participatory design and planning. In addition, the added pressure and policy attempts for decentralization and devolution in Chile may strengthen the regional and local administrations, currently overpowered by the central government, to be more creative in addressing specific problems in their jurisdictions. However, the project typology has not been replicated so far primarily because the local government, despite appreciating the experience, has not had the will and political independence to seek replication. Despite this, communities of the historic area have shown significant resilience, reflected in the fact that by 2013 nearly 70 percent of the lots of the damaged area were used as dwellings and 70 percent of those affected repaired or rebuilt with their own resources, without recourse to public subsidy (Surmaule–CEUT 2013). While there has not been a formal survey after 2013, observable change has been minimal.

The Defense of the Concentrated Schools and Mercado Central

One of the first recommendations from the PRES was to move the Concentrated Schools, the only public schools located in the heart of the historic center that served students from diverse socioeconomic sectors. While the PRES stated that the definition of land uses in their lots should result from “a process matured by citizens,” it recommended the schools’ relocation and incorporated a set of design guidelines for a new infrastructure to be installed at their original site. The high market value of these parcels made a change of use appealing to the private-sector planners. Concurrently, in March 2011, the mayor of Talca said, “the area occupied by the schools would be ideal to build a civic center, that, along with the remodeling of the Mercado Central, make up a powerful development pole for the regional capital, as outlined in the Recovery Plan for Talca prepared by the Grupo Hurtado” (El Centro, March 11, 2011).

The second initiative by the PRES was a proposal for the reconstruction of the Mercado Central by Shared Urban Financing (FUC), which involved delivering a market management concession for a number of years to a private investor in return for the building’s rehabilitation. Alternatively, the mayor could have accepted the financing that the Inter-American Development Bank had committed to the reconstruction of the market through a historic preservation program, but he rejected it. Instead, the economic group Saieh started formulating a redevelopment proposal for this lot. In addition to the Mercado Central and the Concentrated Schools, the PRES proposed an intermodal station project to be developed using the land where the Mercado Estación was located before the earthquake.

Given community opposition, the projects could not be developed under Piñera’s administration. The current president Michelle Bachelet appointed a delegate to assess the state of reconstruction. She also had the mission to resolve outstanding issues, including the disputes over the Concentrated Schools and Mercado Central. A board was formed that included representatives of the central government, the municipality, and the community. The board agreed on a project to repair the schools on site (Rojas Albrecht 2015) and the market project was returned to the public, removing it from the form of concession (Valdés 2015). In both cases, the collective and persistent action of citizens managed to seize the political opportunity opened by the change in government and pressured it to fulfill their demands.

The restorations of the market and the schools are part of the public program Valorisation of Heritage, funded by the Regional Government of Maule with backing from the national government to recover public infrastructure that comprises the history of the city and its inhabitants. Their designs, to be completed by 2017, highlight the institutions’ heritage character, public orientation, and relationship with the context. Both design processes are being accompanied by public participation (TV Maulinos 2016).

As a complement to the previous case studies, this latter one is important for illustrating both the diverse fronts in which effective citizens pushed back against unpopular neoliberal reconstruction initiatives in Talca and the different factors and strategies that made them possible. It is also important because the market and school buildings saved through these struggles are critical to the identity of Talqueños.

Discussion and Conclusions

More than six years after 27F, most neighborhoods in Talca are still under reconstruction and establishing their future direction. This is a medium term for recovery from a major disaster event. Literature on neighborhood recovery after disasters (Birch and Wachter 2006; Edgington 2010; Lizarralde and Johnson 2010; Pelling et al. 2004; Siedman 2013) shows that (a) all neighborhoods do not recover well or return to the same status as prior to the event; (b) external support is needed from government, the donor, and the NGO sectors for many years for regeneration; and (c) institutional arrangements adapt over time to address needs that are not immediately apparent or well understood. These lessons can not only help to partially explain the reconstruction experiences in Talca but also highlight the need for additional efforts to complete the recovery process.

While neoliberal policies have been applied in Chile for forty years without major changes, the last years of the pre-earthquake center-left government led by Bachelet had revealed a growing concern for territorial planning and the quality of neighborhoods. A result of this concern was the Barrio Rehabilitation program that actively incorporated

the participation of citizens in the design of neighborhood plans for long-term development. If this approach had been maintained during the reconstruction, the Barrio Rehabilitation program could have been used in the neighborhoods affected by the earthquake. In contrast, the government of Piñera did not focus on the barrios affected. While macro-policies may have been the same in the two governments, programs and instruments were implemented with different criteria. Pre-earthquake experiences with the Barrio Rehabilitation program demonstrated that with more participatory community planning, there could have been better post-earthquake results in local and micro-local scale interventions.

Talca, we argue, suffered both with the earthquake and with the acceleration and intensification of a neoliberal type of urbanism unleashed to respond to the crisis. The latter could have been avoided (and still can to some extent). We analyzed examples that made evident this neoliberal intensification after the earthquake. These dynamics accentuated sociospatial inequity, accelerated the concentration of capital in fewer hands, privatized services, changed the architectural and the multi-use and diverse character of the central area of the city, promoted mono-functional and car-dependent suburban sprawl, and reduced the regulatory mediating role of the state. The damage done by the earthquake in Talca, despite being extensive, was repairable; the effects of the neoliberal reconstruction, however (sprawl, loss of socio-spatial diversity and capital, displacement of people, loss of sense of place/community), will be more difficult to repair. This denotes the disaster (un)fix: In Talca, the 2010 earthquake remains unfixed—paradoxically, to a significant extent, by policy-driven interventions supposed to fix the disaster. The disaster has simultaneously been used to “get a fix” through expanded opportunities for capitalist accumulation reenergizing slow-paced urban regeneration markets and opening new ones of suburban sprawl.

Yet, this study highlights the Janus-faced nature of the Talca disaster, which triggered efforts in both capital accumulation *and* citizen mobilization. The main lesson from the examples of community-led planning discussed here is that there are better alternatives to the neoliberal approach to disaster recovery. We offered three examples of how housing and reconstruction planning either could have been, or have been and still can be different, which challenges the notion of the inevitability of neoliberalism to respond to disasters:

- a. The alternative reconstruction plan, which instilled the notion that things could be done differently and a social network that continues to work to date: Although the plan was rejected, it led to the formation of a Citizen Council through which the citizens of Talca developed an evolving and engaged critical stance. This, together with numerous forums and seminars, built the basis for an ongoing, counterhegemonic discourse about the reconstruction.
- b. The initiatives of the landless people: While the community publicly opposed the policy-driven expulsion of residents from central urban areas, it was not possible to develop systemic mechanisms to avoid it. Yet, one of the few successful experiences coming out of this struggle was the project Los Maitenes, where a group of earthquake victims with support of NGOs and a small local builder, and the collaboration of the local SERVIU, helped develop a community-responsive project in a central area.
- c. The defense of the Concentrated Schools and the Central Market: This was the most successful expression of citizen resistance to the prevalent model of reconstruction. In both cases, the concerned actors, the educational community, and the tenants acted together for more than three years. They got support from NGOs, other social organizations, and the public, who rallied around the defense of public institutions that had sufficient symbolic value to mobilize and sustain an effective resistance.

These examples demonstrate the diverse and contingent nature of resistances to neoliberal urban transformations. While the success of these struggles is not guaranteed or permanent, the community initiatives with greater prospects demonstrated cross-sectoral coalition building (including professional, academic, and real estate actors), training in technical and political skills for engagement, place-based proposal making, multiscalar solidarity, and media savvy.

These examples offer lessons for planners on how best to lend professional support to such community struggles. In addition, planners also can assist and need assistance from the public sector to help define and strengthen the mediating regulatory and negotiating role of the state to conduct reconstruction processes in manners that facilitate sustainable and equitable processes and outcomes. Planners need to systemically understand the implications of programs, policies, and projects often pushed in times of emergency as urgent and inevitable that may not necessarily favor a healthy long-term redevelopment of communities recovering from disasters. They also need to be politically savvy and courageous to denounce and resist programs and policies when necessary, and work with/for communities to define and promote more just and sustainable postdisaster futures.

The Talca case study allows us to highlight some key lessons for planning and public policy processes related to post-disaster recovery. First, the importance of appropriate *policy frameworks* and *public leadership* to guide action in processes of post-disaster recovery. In the case reviewed, the policy framework relinquished public leadership and placed much of the responsibility on private actors, minimizing the role of the state. This resulted not only in an inability to guide emerging urban phenomena but also in diminishing public debate on the common good and what future was desired for the city.

A second issue concerns *the role of municipalities*. The experiences of post-27F rebuilding showed that Chilean municipalities interacted differently with the processes of reconstruction. Some got intensely engaged; others were mere spectators, such as the city of Talca. Most of the tasks related to reconstruction were not the local governments' responsibility, and this needs to change. The municipality, which has the constitutional mandate to ensure the participation of the inhabitants in the development of the community, should be a key player in the process of postdisaster recovery and reconstruction. Involvement in the reconstruction process should not be left to the discretion of mayors, lest communities risk been unable to incorporate their interests in the process.

Third, the importance of *location* in reconstruction planning. Special policy and planning provisions can prevent both the loss of convenient predisaster locations and the promotion of suburbanization. In Chile, there is a complementary housing subsidy that can be added to the basic subvention that in theory helps to improve the location of new projects of public housing. However, its implementation has very low requirements for its application, it can be applied virtually anywhere in the city and does not discriminate between good and bad locations, which in practice means an increase of the subsidy quickly captured by the land market without necessarily favoring good possible sites. Land policy should ensure the provision of public housing stocks in nonperipheral land.

Fourth is to *strengthen civil society and communities*. Particularly, supporting the role of organizations demanding housing, increasing their ability to socially control the reconstruction process and raising their awareness of location as a right. In the case analyzed, we observed that civil organizations committed to socially controlling the reconstruction process failed to influence public policy in many cases. This implies the need to support their work through new funding streams and frameworks for more effective participation.¹⁰

While difficult, these recommendations could have been implemented even within the Chilean neoliberal context. The preexisting instruments allowed the implementation of different, more appropriate solutions; however, the inflexibility and the interests of many of the actors did not permit their wide implementation. Some of the main problems that hindered this were weaknesses in the role of municipalities and local actors, lack of substantive participatory spaces, and mistrust between the social organizations and NGOs and the newly installed rightist government after 27F.

In addition in Chile, the 27F policy debate focused on the reconstruction. There is a need for a more systemic model of risk management that contemplates the different stages of prevention, occurrence, emergency, and reconstruction (Olshansky, Hopkins, and Johnson 2012; Vargas 2002). A hopeful effect of the 2010 disaster has been a renewed interest and investment in planning. There are now new academic programs, research centers, and public and private planning efforts in a country that

hardly had any before. There is still much more to do creating and reforming mechanisms for spatial planning and land management. Current legislation on private property makes expropriation of land, transfer of property rights, land readjustment, coordination of new land uses, and relocation of the population affected by a disaster extremely difficult. A good sign for the enhancement of the social function of land has been given by the new National Urban Development Policy (MINVU 2013), which expands public capacities for managing urban land for social integration, neighborhood regeneration, and reuse. Yet, it needs to be integrated into the new guidelines of the National Policy on Disaster Risk Management (ONEMI 2014). The subsequent catastrophic events of 2014 in Chile—the Iquique 8.3 earthquake and the Valparaiso megafire—confirmed that since 2010 there had been insufficient progress in improving the institutional framework and instruments for rebuilding urban places after disasters. In accordance with the guidelines defined in the Report of the Reconstruction of the Presidency (Presidencia de Chile 2014) and the National Urban Development Policy, a “new deal” is required between the state, the community, and private actors to support urban planning.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. Nineteenth-century liberal thinker Herbert Spencer used the phrase “there is no alternative,” a slogan, shortened as TINA, most recently popularized by the Conservative British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. It meant that capitalism, and particularly its most recent version of global neoliberalism, was the only way for societies to develop.
2. Particularly with the NGO Surmaule, which developed a permanent work supporting landless victims in Talca. It collaborated in the creation of the first housing committees and promoted community building processes in the neighborhoods most affected. Furthermore, it generated multiple spaces for debate on the reconstruction process integrating lay people and academics.
3. Until the 1960 Valdivia earthquake, there was a greater presence of the state as an actor that planned reconstructions and regulated city growth, e.g., after the earthquake of 1929, the creation of the Law of City Transformation 1929; and after the earthquake 1939, the creation of the Corporation for the Promotion of Production (CORFO) and the Corporation for Reconstruction and Relief, an institution that survived until the creation of the Housing Corporation (CORVI). After the 1960 earthquake, the creation of the decree of law 2514 of 1960 amending the General Ordinance title referred to the stability of buildings. After the earthquake of Illapel 1971, the issue of the Law of Earthquakes and Catastrophes, still current today, which defines the disaster situation and the classification of

victims, and grants the executive the power to help the victims and sanction speculators. Already in the 1985 earthquake, a withdrawal of the state from planning is noticed. Several regulatory construction ordinances fell into disuse by changes in the years 1977–1981, aimed to free the land market and stimulate the real estate market initiative. Control mechanisms were also eliminated, leaving this responsibility to the developers themselves; reviewers of calculation in the municipalities were terminated, transferring this task to reviewers hired by the companies themselves. The rule requiring studies of soil mechanics was modified; professional associations (with changes made in 1981) lost all ethical custody of their members and, finally, a series of provisions and amendments moved the responsibility for reconstruction (and construction) from the city to the private enterprise, leaving the state without much authority for the effective regulation of urban development (Letelier and Boyco 2011).

4. Location as a use-value asset would grant disaster victims the opportunity to reconstruct in the same area after a disaster (right to location). This is particularly difficult to attain in capitalist reconstruction projects. A right to live in the same location that you rented has not borne out in practice anywhere in the world after a large-scale disaster. Chile and other governments (New Zealand, United States, Japan, Australia) link housing replacement (voucher, subsidy, or built) with land ownership.
5. These goals could have been implemented by regulatory plans, which are preexisting instruments of land use planning in Chile, but due to the long periods required for their formulation and approval, the government decided to implement special plans—PRES.
6. For instance, a report commissioned by Mary Comerio (2013) from the University of California at Berkeley presents a strong case that the central government's program worked well for the country and delivered swift recovery from the disaster. Yet, community groups critical of the government were not allowed to meet Comerio, and her report only cites official national sources: ONEMI and MINVU.
7. *Unidad de Fomento* (UF) is a unit of account used in Chile, a predominant measure for determining the cost of real estate and housing, determined by the Central Bank of Chile.
8. Villa la Paz, Astaburuaga, Chorrillos, Santa Ana, Las Heras, and San Agustín to the north; Seminario and Eden to the west; El Prado, Abate Molina, and South Central to the south; and Step Moya and Oriente to the east.
9. In Talca, only 7 percent of densification subsidies were used by victims (SERVIU Región del Maule 2014).
10. The experience of Colonia Guerrero, Mexico City, after the 1985 earthquake is an example. This community was organized prior to the earthquake and received funds from the central government after the earthquake to rebuild their own housing in the neighborhood, therefore capturing all of the "use value" for residents. They obtained land rights and collectively rebuilt (Siembieda 2005).

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